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21.
Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Sugato Dasgupta Kirk A. Randazzo Reginald S. Sheehan Kenneth C. Williams 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(4):315-335
This paper studies a situation wherein a set of voters choose between two alternatives in the presence of a payoff externality. Specifically, regardless of her intrinsic preference, a voter’s payoff is maximized should she vote for the alternative that garners a majority of the votes cast. Are votes coordinated on a single alternative? Using laboratory experiments, we examine voting patterns in sequential voting and simultaneous voting elections. Across both election types, we also vary the amount of information that an individual voter has regarding the intrinsic preferences of the other voters. Our main findings are as follows. In the “low” information treatment, sequential voting elections facilitate coordinated voting. However, in the “high” information treatment, voting patterns are not dependent on how the election is structured. 相似文献
22.
Wiji Arulampalam Sugato Dasgupta Amrita Dhillon Bhaskar Dutta 《Journal of development economics》2009
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974–75 to 1996–97. We find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing. 相似文献
23.
Indraneel Dasgupta 《American journal of agricultural economics》2005,87(4):1090-1091
24.
Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Hua Wang Nlandu Mamingi Benoit Laplante Susmita Dasgupta 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,24(3):245-262
Only a limited number of papers haveempirically examined the determinants of themonitoring and enforcement activities performedby the environmental regulator. Moreover, mostof these studies have taken place in thecontext of developed countries. In this paper,we empirically examine the determinants of theenforcement of pollution charges in China.More precisely, we seek to identify thecharacteristics which may give firms more orless bargaining power with local environmentalauthorities pertaining to the enforcement(collection) of pollution charges. Firms fromthe private sector appear to have lessbargaining power than state-owned enterprises.Firms facing an adverse financial situationalso appear to have more bargaining power.Finally, we also show that the higher thesocial impact of a firm's emissions (asmeasured by the presence of complaints), thesmaller the bargaining power of the firms withlocal environmental authorities. 相似文献
25.
In a recent survey of 820 rice, potato, bean, eggplant, cabbage, sugarcane and mango farmers in Bangladesh, over 47% of farmers were found to be overusing pesticides. With only 4% of farmers formally trained in pesticide use or handling, and over 87% openly admitting to using little or no protective measures while applying pesticides, overuse is potentially a great threat to farmer health as well as the environment. Pesticide overuse was initially modelled using a three‐equation, trivariate probit framework with health effects and misperception of pesticide risk as endogenous dummy variables. Significance tests revealed that health and misperception were not endogenous to overuse, suggesting a bivariate probit model for health effects and misperception and a separate probit model for overuse. Health effects were found to be a function of the amount of pesticides used in production, nutritional status and income, while misperception of pesticide risk was determined by health impairments from pesticides and the toxicity of chemicals used. Pesticide overuse was significantly explained by variation in misperception, income, farm ownership, the toxicity of chemicals used, crop composition and geographical location. These results highlight the necessity for policymakers to design effective and targeted outreach programmes which deal specifically with pesticide risk, safe handling and averting behaviour. Ideally, the approach would be participatory in nature to address key informational gaps, as well as increasing: farmers’ awareness. The results also point to specific crops and locations experiencing a higher prevalence of overuse. Focusing efforts on these crops and geographical areas may have the most measurable effects on pesticide overuse. 相似文献
26.
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power. 相似文献
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29.
Taradas?Bandyopadhyay Indraneel?Dasgupta Prasanta?K.?PattanaikEmail author 《Economic Theory》2004,23(3):589-599 (2004)
Summary. We present a general revealed preference theorem concerning stochastic choice behavior by consumers. We show that, when the consumer spends her entire wealth, the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference due to Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) is equivalent to a restriction on stochastic demand behavior that we call stochastic substitutability. We also show that the relationship between the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and Samuelson's inequality in the deterministic theory, and the main result of Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) are both special cases of our result.Received: 10 September 2001, Revised: 4 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D11. Correspondence to: Prasanta K. PattanaikOur greatest debt is to the referee of this paper, who made numerous helpful suggestions. We thank Robin Cubitt, Kunal Sengupta and seminar audiences at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Statistical Institute, University of East Anglia, Universidad Carlos III, University of Essex and University of Montreal for their helpful comments. Prasanta K. Pattanaik acknowledges his intellectual debt to Salvador Barbera, Tapas Majumdar and Amartya Sen. 相似文献
30.
Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Giancarlo Corsetti Amil Dasgupta Stephen Morris Hyun Song Shin 《The Review of economic studies》2004,71(1):87-113
Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals. Even abstracting from signalling, the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. Relative to the case in which there is no large investor, small investors attack the currency when fundamentals are stronger. Yet, the difference can be small, or non-existent, depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors. Adding signalling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders' behaviour much stronger. 相似文献